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Since Everson v. Board of Education1 ushered in the application of the
establishment clause of the First Amendment2 to states, the Supreme
Court has sought to define the "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier"'
that separates the religious from the secular. In Everson, Justice Black
described the establishment clause in absolute terms," and embraced
Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor 5 as an appropriate im-
age to describe the proper relationship between religion and the state. But
the Court soon retreated from the notion that strict separation is possible,
or even desirable,' and some have questioned the usefulness of Jefferson's
metaphor.7 Recognizing that government cannot always avoid involvement
in religious affairs, the Court now emphasizes the need for government to
maintain "neutrality" towards, rather than separation from, religion.8 In
1. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONsT. amend. I,
cl. 1.
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
4.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Eters n, 330 U.S. at 15-16. Despite this absolutist interpretation, the Court in Everson upheld a
New Jersey statute which paid transportation costs of Catholic parochial school students. Although
four Justices dissented from the holding, the Court unanimously favored the broad reading of the
establishment clause exemplified by the above quote. See id. at 18 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (joined by
Frankfurter, J.); id. at 30 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (joined by Jackson and Burton, JJ.).
5. Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, 8 JEFF. WORKS 113, quoted with approval in
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) and Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
6. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). See also Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Bail, 473
U.S. 373, 382 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1983); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
7. "A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech." McCollum, 333 U.S. at 247
(Reed, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 382; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1983); Commit-
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many cases neutrality is achieved through separation, but where separa-
tion is impossible it is not yet clear how neutrality is defined.
The establishment clause requires that the secular and religious spheres
be distinguished in order to determine whether a governmental action is
prohibited. This distinction has been developed by the Court primarily in
the context of education, in scrutinizing religious influences in public
schools9 and government funding of private schools."0 The focus on
schooling has enabled the Court to develop the idea of religious neutrality
under the fiction that religion can always be confined to private life; chil-
dren can receive and practice religion when they are not in school. This
assumption of separability is invalid, however, when government controls
every moment of an individual's day and must either provide or decline to
offer religious facilities.
The classic examples of such a situation have been military bases and
prisons. Government funding of chaplains and other religious services in
these cases has been justified, despite apparent establishment clause viola-
tions, as a permissible accommodation of the free exercise clause rights of
the individuals involved." But a stronger challenge, which cannot be
solved through a "free exercise accommodation" theory," has remained
largely unexamined: state foster care policies. Despite evident establish-
ment clause problems with every approach to foster care, there has been
only one establishment clause challenge to a foster care scheme: the New
York constitutional, statutory, and regulatory scheme for placing foster
children according to religion, as applied by New York City, has been
challenged in a series of cases in federal court brought by the Children's
Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of a class
.of black Protestant foster children." While these cases-Wilder v.
tee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
669 (1970); id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963);
Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 18; id. at 23-24 (Jackson, J., dissenting); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
220 (1971) (facially neutral regulation violates constitutional requirement of neutrality if it burdens
free exercise); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (neutrality
requires occasional accommodation of religion).
9. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington, 374 U.S. 203.
10. E.g., Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
11. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 92-114 and accompanying text.
13. The lack of other establishment clause challenges to foster care is explained by several factors.
Funds are rarely available to litigate foster care issues to the appellate stage, and the natural parents
are usually incapable of pursuing the matter. Furthermore, not much attention is paid to religion in
making foster care placements. For example, in FOSTER CHILDREN AND THE COURTS (M. Hardin
ed. 1983) [hereinafter FOSTER CHILDREN], a definitive resource for practitioners in this field, no
reference is made to religion as a factor in placement. If religion is especially important to the parents,
appropriate placement probably will be arranged informally. The child's advocate would raise reli-
gious objections only if doing so promised to improve the quality of the child's placement, or if the
child expressed a strong preference. In this latter case, a free exercise claim would be easier to pursue
than one based on the establishment clause. Only in New York City has the structure of the foster
care program made litigation attractive to potential plaintiffs.
[Vol. 98: 617
Establishment Clause Accommodation
Sugarman ("Wilder I")"4 and Wilder v. Bernstein ("Wilder II," "Wil-
der III,"'" and "Wilder !V"'7)-failed to address the establishment clause
problems posed by foster care directly, they provide a useful context for an
examination of these problems.
This Note will analyze the establishment clause problems that arise
from state involvement in the placement and care of foster children. Sec-
tion I will compare foster care with other challenges to government's abil-
ity to avoid involvement in religious affairs. Section II will demonstrate
that establishment clause problems inevitably flow from any state foster
care policy. Section III will argue that establishment clause violations in
this context cannot be avoided through the "free exercise accommodation"
doctrine which has been developed previously, and will suggest that "neu-
trality" must be reexamined to deal with this challenge. An "establish-
ment clause accommodation doctrine," based on a result-oriented defini-
tion of neutrality when separation is impossible, will be advanced.
Because legitimate governmental and religious interests overlap and fre-
quently conflict, steps that seem to keep government and religion apart
may have broad effects in both spheres. For the establishment clause to
control these effects, content must be given to the concept of neutrality.
I. FOSTER CARE AS A CHALLENGE TO SEPARATION
In the United States, most rights and responsibilities for raising chil-
dren rest with the parents, in accordance with the strong value placed on
the sanctity of the family."8 Parents have the right to determine a child's
education and religious activities, 9 subject to the limitations of compelling
state interests.20 When the natural family is incapable of caring for a
child, however, and will not consent to adoption, states must assume pa-
rental responsibilities. 2 ' This places the state in a unique situation in
14. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three judge court) (per curiam) (upholding facial consti-
tutionality of the New York City foster care scheme).
15. 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (certifying standing for a plaintiff class to challenge
scheme as applied).
16 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (approving settlement decree over objections).
17. 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming Wilder I).
18. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (state may not terminate parental
rights without proof by clear and convincing evidence); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (state compelled public school attendance unreasonably interferes with parents' right to direct
rearing of offspring); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (statute prohibiting teaching of
foreign languages to grade school children unreasonably interferes with parents' power to control
childrens' education).
19. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (state compelled high
school attendanre unreasonably interferes with religious interest of Amish parents).
20. See Prince v. Massachussetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-68 & 170 (1944). See also Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state may compel children's vaccinations over parents' religious
ohiections).
21. Natural parents retain certain rights, which usually include visitation rights, the right to a
hearing prior to full termination of rights, see infra note 26, and possibly the right to make significant
medical, educational, and religious decisions. See Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Perma-
nence for Children in Foster Care, in FoSTER CHILDREN, supra note 13, at 128, 136-37.
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which it controls every aspect of the child's upbringing. As a result, the
state cannot evade its responsibility to make decisions that will have a
profound effect on a child's religious faith. 2
A. Background of the Problem
Foster care has a relatively short and ill-described history as a distinct
type of child welfare program. Until the mid-nineteenth century, or-
phaned or unwanted children were provided for in a variety of ways, in-
cluding indentures or apprenticeships, placement in almshouses with in-
sane and diseased persons, and other methods that did not involve
government intervention, while most reform was accomplished by reli-
gious charitable institutions.23 Even with the advent of government in-
volvement in the problem, many children were cared for by private insti-
tutions such as the New York Children's Aid Society, a Protestant
organization that placed children on farms in the West, which were
thought to have a better moral climate.2 Although the farms were re-
ferred to as foster homes, in practice most placements were permanent
and the distinction between foster care and adoption had little significance.
Modem protection of the rights of the natural parents has made this
distinction extremely important.25 A family going through difficult times
may voluntarily place a child in foster care without abandoning all paren-
tal rights; this option is attractive to parents who hope to regain custody
when they are better able to care for their child. More frequently, place-
ment is involuntary and authorized by a court through a neglect or depen-
dency proceeding. Foster care placement represents a less drastic and
more easily approved form of state intervention than termination of pa-
rental rights.26
Ideally, foster care is a temporary measure with the goal of returning
the child to the natural parents when they are again able to provide care.
Unfortunately, of the 251,000 foster children in 1982, over half remained
in foster care for more than two years, and nearly one quarter remained
for over five years,2" often until the child reached majority.28 In practice,
22. In this Note, "religion" and "faith" will be used to refer to any set of beliefs falling within the
scope of the free exercise and establishment clauses. No attempt will be made to address the serious
definitional problems posed by these terms.
23. M. WOLINS & I. PILIAVIN, INSTITUTION OR FOSTER FAMILY: A CENTURY OF DEBATE 10
(1964); Cole, Advocating for Adoption Services, in FOSTER CHILDREN, supra note 13, at 449, 451.
24. M. WOLINS & I. PILIAVIN, supra note 23, at 10-13.
25. See Mlyniec, Prosecuting a Termination of Parental Rights Case, in FOSTER CHILDREN,
supra note 13, at 193.
26. To terminate parental rights, a state must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In foster care placements, the burden is generally reduced
to a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(b) (McKinney 1983).
27. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., 1ST SEss., STAFF DATA AND MATER-
IALS RELATED TO FOSTER CARE, ADOPTION ASSISTANCE, AND CHILD WELFARE SERVICES UNDER
THE SOCIAL SECURITY AT 4, 25 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter STAFF DATA]. The median dura-
tion of foster care in 1982 was 25 months, but the mean was 40 months. Id. at 25; See also id. at 7
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foster care is often continued, even after return to the natural parents is
clearly impossible, in order to avoid difficult legal proceedings and to con-
tinue receiving government funds.29
The general uncertainty and lack of permanency in a foster child's
life3" is believed to be harmful to the child's social, emotional, and psycho-
logical development.31 Children are often in foster care during the entire
period when they are likely to form their religious beliefs. The content of
the religious training (or lack thereof) that such children receive therefore
affects their eventual religious faith.
B. Foster Care Compared to Other Challenges to Separation
Since Everson, the Supreme Court has formulated three criteria to de-
termine whether a governmental action violates the establishment clause.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 the Court crystallized establishment clau.se doc-
trine in the following test: "First, the statute must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
("Child welfare researchers noted that the likelihood of a child's leaving foster care decreased with th6
length of stay.").
28. R. HUBBELL, FOSTER CARE AND FAMILIES 6 (1981). It has been estimated that in 1984 as
many as 130,000 children nationwide reached eighteen years of age while in foster care. See
Demchak, Services Ordered for Homeless Youths, 6 YOUTH L. NEWS 12, 13 (Sept.-Oct. 1985).
29. Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for Children in Foster Care, in
FOSTER CHILDREN, supra note 13, 128, at 139; see infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
30. Many foster children are placed in more than one program. "Nearly 60% of the children in
foster care in New York City have experienced more than one placement, and about 28% have exper-
ienced three or more." NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILDREN IN
FOSTER CARE, REPORT ON PERMANENCE PLANNING iii-iv (March 1986).
31. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & R. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD (1973).
In an attempt to reduce these problems, Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (P.L. 96-272). The Act provides fiscal incentives to, the states to prevent unnecessary place-
ments and improve planning by making federal funds contingent upon implementation of alternative
services and formulation of a "permanency plan" for each child in foster care. P.L. 96-272 also
created a new entitlement program to provide adoption assistance payments to parents adopting chil-
dren with "special needs," thereby reducing the financial benefit of keeping these children in foster
care. For a detailed discussion of this law, see Allen, Golubrock & Olson, A Guide to the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER CHILDREN, supra note 13, at 575.
P.L. 96-272 has reduced dramatically the number of children in foster care. According to one study,
from 1977 to 1982 the number of children in foster care declined from 502,000 to 274,000. See D.
MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION 49 (1986). The Senate Finance Committee staff has called the
1977 figure "so far out of line with the data for other years as to appear highly questionable," STAFF
DATA, supra note 27, at 4 n.3, but suggests no alternative figure. There has been less success, how-
ever, in reducing the length of foster child placements. From 1980 to 1982, the mean duration of
foster care placement declined from 27 months to 25; the median declined from 42 months to 40.
STAFF DATA, supra note 27, at 25. It seems probable that the federal measures have been more
successful in preventing the type of foster care placements that are likely to be short-term (by giving
states incentives to provide assistance within the natural family setting) than in solving the problems
that lead to long-term foster care.
32. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down Rhode Island and Pennsylvannia "salary supplements"
and other forms of aid to private schools).
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'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "" If a statute fails
any one of the three parts of the Lemon test, it is unconstitutional. While
the Court has indicated that there are some situations where the establish-
ment clause apparently is violated under the Lemon test and yet the gov-
ernmental action remains valid, 4 none of the explanations thus far ad-
vanced for abrogating the Lemon test applies to the foster care challenge.
1. Military and Prisons
Government funding of chaplains and religious facilities in the military
and in prisons has been the subject of extensive litigation and academic
discussion." Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
an establishment clause challenge to these programs,3" the subject has
been used by the Court in dicta as an example of permissible government
involvement in religion."
Justice Brennan's lengthy concurring opinion in Abington v. Schempp38
contains the most complete treatment of this issue. Justice Brennan noted
that certain practices that seem to violate the establishment clause, includ-
ing government provision of religious facilities in the armed services and
penal institutions, may be necessary to protect the religious liberties guar-
anteed by the free exercise clause. Brennan distinguished public schools
from the armed services and prisons on two grounds. First, there presum-
33. Id. at 612-13.
34. In addition to the situations discussed in this section, the Court has twice declined to apply the
Lemon test. In Marsh v. Chambers, 462 U.S. 783 (1983), the Court rejected a challenge to prayers
opening sessions of the Nebraska legislature, emphasizing the long history of such ceremonies, which
date back to the First Congress. In dissent, Justice Brennan demonstrated that the practice violated all
three parts of the Lemon test. Id. at 796-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984), upholding a city-funded creche in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, the Court emphasized
the secular context of the display and the secular nature of Christmas in general, and criticized
"mechanicail]" application of the Lemon test, although it claimed the holding was not inconsistent
with the test. Id. at 678. Again, Justice Brennan argued that Lemon had been violated and expressed
hope that the exception created by the majority would be limited. Id. at 695-97 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The Court recently has reaffirmed the Lemon test. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
35. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam) (prisons); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (military); Kaplan, Military Mirrors on the Wall: Nonestablishment and the
Military Chaplaincy, 95 YALE L.J. 1210 (1986); Knight, Religion in Prison: Balancing the Free
Exercise, No Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses, 26 J. CHURCH & ST. 437 (1984).
36. See Kaplan, supra note 35, at 1210-11. The scarcity of direct challenges to funding is ex-
plained by the lack of direct victims. Generally, the harm which the establishment clause forbids is
directly symbolic but only indirectly financial (through the use of taxpayers' money to support reli-
gion). The ideological groups that support most establishment clause challenges tend to concern them-
selves with public settings, such as schools or public religious displays, which have greater symbolic
impact, ironically overlooking situations where government action has a far more direct impact on
individual religious beliefs.
37. Lynch 465 U.S. at 675; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 810-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Abington
School Dist. v Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 309
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 449 n.4 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
38. 374 U.S. at 296-()9 (Brennan, J., concurring) (striking state laws requiring public schools to
begin each day with Bible readings). While Abington preceded Lemon, it established the standards
that were to become the first and second prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 222.
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ably is no coercion to embrace a particular religious faith where adults are
involved: "the soldier or convict who declines the opportunities for wor-
ship would not ordinarily subject himself to the suspicion or obloquy of
his peers." 3 Second, the absence of religion from public schools does not
prevent the child from worshipping at home: "The student's compelled
presence in school for five days a week in no way renders the regular
religious facilities of the community less accessible to him."4
Neither of these distinctions applies to the foster care setting. Without
parental influence to help the child form religious beliefs, the coercive ef-
fect of the state's decision as to the religious training of the foster child is
far greater than the potential influence of the same decision as to religion
in public schools. Furthermore, the state controls (or is responsible for) all
possible exposure to religion the foster child may receive.41 If, for exam-
ple, the state refuses to provide religious training to a child, that child will
receive no religious training. As Judge Newman wrote in Wilder IV, gov-
ernment "extension of financial aid [to private schools] is gratuitous," but
in foster care, "the state must take some steps to assure that the religious
needs of the children are met."'42
Moreover, the presence of a free exercise right that would justify state
provision of religious training, analogous to the right a soldier or a convict
might assert, is problematic, because children, especially younger children,
often make no attempt to exercise their free exercise rights. Although it
has been suggested that the right could lie elsewhere, particularly with the
natural parents, 3 this Note will argue that free exercise rights cannot be
used to determine state policy towards religion in foster care."
2. Adoption
State approval of an adoption may appear to be a more drastic exercise
of state power than maintenance of a child in foster care, and does share
many of the same constitutional infirmities. By conferring full parental
rights upon adoptive parents, the state makes a decision that is generally
more permanent than foster care. Many states have expressly granted to
natural parents the right to determine the religion of the adoptive parents.
The constitutionality and practical wisdom of this policy was discussed
extensively during the 1950's and 1970's.4 5 After these debates, many
39. Id. at 298.
40. Id. at 299.
41. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
42. 848 F.2d at 1348.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 97-100.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 92-114.
45. E.g., Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. REv. 333, 334-35 (1955);
Comment, A Reconsideration of the Religious Element in Adoption, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 780
(1971); Note, Religion as a Factor in Adoption, Guardianship and Custody, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
376 (1954) [hereinafter Columbia Note]; Note, Religious Factors in Adoption, 28 IND. L.J. 401
(1953).
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states repealed statutory provisions requiring that attempts be made to
match the religion of the natural parents with the religion of the adoptive
parents; nonetheless, approximately one third of the states continue to
have some form of religious matching provision for adoptions."' Although
there are problems with religious matching in adoption decisions,47 adop-
tion poses a lesser challenge to the establishment clause than foster care
for two reasons: the state's involvement with an adoption does not con-
tinue over an extended period of time, and the state ordinarily does not
undertake to fund the adopted child's upbringing."'
In most situations where parental rights are terminated, the state
awards permanent custody to new parents via adoption. After this occurs,
the state's rights and responsibilities are no different than they are for all
children. Although the state may use religious factors in determining to
whom parental rights will be granted, it cannot enforce any requirements
as to the child's religious upbringing after custody is awarded. 49 Courts
occasionally have considered agreements to raise the children in a religion
other than that of the adoptive parents in making adoption awards,50 but
it is doubtful that a court would enforce such an agreement. Once custody
is awarded, adoptive parents have the same rights as natural parents, 51
46. According to a statutory survey in Columbia Note, supra note 45, at 376 n.5, 43 states had
religious matching statutes in 1954. Today, 17 states continue to require religious matching in at least
some adoption placements. Nine of these states use some form of language approximating the "when-
ever practicable" standard discussed infra text accompanying note 77. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-435
(1975); MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-520 (1984) (state "licensees" shall give "preference" to
matching unless natural parents specify otherwise, but courts may or may not consider religion in
passing on adoptions, id. at § 5-316); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.221 (Vernon 1983); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 62.241 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:19 (1977); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 32 (1987); OHIo
REV. CoDE. ANN. § 2151.32 (Anderson 1976); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5113 (Purdon 1975)
("preferred"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1520 (Law. Co-op. 1985). Four states use more mandatory
language. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 911 (1981) (mandatory unless waived by natural parents);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1519 (1981) ("whenever possible"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-509 (1984)
("The religious faith of children . . . shall be preserved and protected"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
1119 (West 1987) ("if at all possible"). Three states use matching only when requested by the natural
parents. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.471 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (placements shall not be
denied on account of religion unless contrary to the natural parent[s]' expressed wishes); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4063 (Supp. 1987) (matching if requested in writing and appropriate family
available); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.255 (West Supp. 1988) (matching if explicit parental prefer-
ence, but apparently subordinate to racial and ethnic matching). California allows institutions to re-
fuse to give up children to adoptive parents of a different faith. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11264
(West 1980).
47. See articles cited supra note 45.
48. But see supra note 31.
49. See Pfeffer, supra note 45, at 358-59.
50. For example, in In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958), a
New York court granted custody, over the Catholic natural mother's objections, to a Protestant couple
that had agreed to raise the child as a Catholic. The court based the award on the natural mother's
sworn affidavit stating that she had no religion, and refused to acknowledge her attempts to repudiate
the affidavit; it is unclear whether the adoptive parent's agreement had any effect on the decision.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. Doms. R.L. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1983).
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and judicial scrutiny of a child's religious upbringing would violate the
religion clauses.52
When an adoption is granted, the government generally does not fund
the child's upbringing.53 With foster care, however, most states are finan-
cially responsible for nearly every aspect of the child's daily care, includ-
ing room, board, and incidental expenses.5 Some states explicitly include
the cost of religious education,55 and those that do not apparently make no
attempt to prevent use of government funds for religious purposes. With
the exceptions of military, prisons, and legislative chaplains, such direct
government funding of religious exercises is rare, if not unique,56 and
seems to raise serious establishment clause problems.
II. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO RELIGION IN FOSTER CARE
When creating a foster care policy, a state can either address the ques-
tion of religious upbringing or decline to do so. If the state addresses the
question, it must decide whether to provide religious training, and, if
training is provided, what religion should be taught. The most obvious
establishment clause problems arise with regard to this last decision,5" but
each of the three primary approaches to religion in foster care-secular
upbringing, no consideration of religion, and religious matching-violates
the establishment clause. The nature of these infringements becomes evi-
dent upon an examination of the effects of each policy on the religious
beliefs of the individual children involved, as well as on the religious
makeup of society as a whole.
5Z See Paolella v. Phillips, 27 Misc. 2d 763, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (N.Y. Special Term 1960)
("The policy of the law with respect to religious upbringing is one of non-interference."); In re
Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955); Whalen v. Olmstead,
61 Conn. 263, 23 A. 964 (1891); Pfeffer, supra note 45, at 350, 356-57. But see infra note 77.
53. But see supra note 31. Adoptive parents are eligible for welfare programs available to all
families, such as Aid to Families With Dependent Children.
54. In New York City, "[a]bout 90% of the per diem expenses of the children are paid . . . from
federal, state, and city funds." Wilder IV, 848 F.2d at 1341.
Pub. L. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.),
specifies that foster care payments are intended to cover the cost of food, clothing, shelter, supervision,
school supplies, and personal incidentals.
55. States may provide for funding of religious exercises by statute, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, para. 2217, §7(a)(1 1) (Smith-Hurd 1936) (directing the Department of Social Services to publish
regulations requiring child care facilities to "protect[] and foster[] . . . the panicular faith of the
children served"), or through regulations, see, e.g., N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 18, § 441.11
(1987); MD. REGs. CODE tit. 11, §§ 07.02.13.IOG(4), 07.02.13.12E(3) (1987) (requiring foster care
institutions and group homes to provide children with opportunities for worship and other religious
activities).
56. But see Religious Schools Get U.S. Aid Abroad, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1988, § 1, at 11, col. 4
(federal Agency for International Development has funded religious schools abroad).
57. For example, it unquestionably would be a violation of the establishment clause for a state to
raise all foster children as Protestants. This would violate all three parts of the Lemon test by advanc-
ing one religion to the detriment of others. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
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A. Secular Upbringing
Despite the evident establishment clause problems posed by state spon-
sorship of religious training for foster children, no state has ever applied
an analogy to public schools by requiring that foster children be given a
secular upbringing. Such a policy would be politically unthinkable; as
Justice Douglas said in Zorach v. Clauson, "[w]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.""8
With older children, it is perhaps feasible for institutions to make reli-
gious facilities available at the child's initiative, as is done in the military
and in prisons; younger children, however, are not likely to seek religious
training on their own. "Voluntarism" has often been mentioned as one of
the ideals behind the religion clauses,5" but it is unreasonable to demand
that young children voluntarily choose their own religious training. 0
Waiting for a child to choose her religion might be compared to waiting
for a child to choose what language she would like to speak; neither lan-
guage nor religion is likely to come without experience.
If it is true, as seems obvious, that a child raised in a secular environ-
ment is less likely to develop religious faith, then a policy favoring secular
upbringing Would have a determinative effect on the religious beliefs of
foster children. Furthermore, the number of people in society with no reli-
gious beliefs would probably increase. The Supreme Court often has
voiced concern that the establishment clause should not give rise to results
that would be hostile to religion. Indeed, when invoking the establishment
clause to invalidate a state action, the Court usually insists that it is not
"manifest[ing] a governmental hostility to religion or religious teach-
ings." '61 Attempts to secularize the foster care environment would tend to
.inhibit religion and therefore would run afoul of the second prong of the
Lemon test, as actions tending to inhibit religion. 2
B. Religion Not Considered
In most states, religion is generally not taken into account when making
foster care placement decisions. The religious training a foster child will
receive, in the absence of her own initiative, will probably be in the faith
58. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
59. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1160 (2d ed. 1988) (between principles of voluntarism
and separatism, "voluntarism seems to be more fundamental").
60. See Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings, 34
N.Y.U. L. REv. 649, 663 (1959).
61. McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948); see also Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (prohibiting Bible readings is not hostile to religion); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-34 (1962) (prohibiting official prayer in public schools not hostile).
62. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. This result becomes extremely important when free
exercise interests fail to jutify government sponsorship of religious practices. See infra notes 92-114
and accompanying text.
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of the foster family, group home, or institution in which she is placed.
Many institutions are openly sectarian in nature,63 with no state regula-
tion of proselytizing practices. By allowing the religious question to be
settled randomly, states avoid at least the appearance of becoming entan-
gled in religious affairs.
Nonetheless, the foster care experience will inevitably affect the child's
religious affiliation. State-designated custodians at all times act under
state authority. When a Catholic foster group home brings the children to
mass, for example, it does so while exercising the state's in loco parentis
power. 4 This exercise of state power to advance religion cannot be justi-
fied by the fact that the state did not intend to influence the children. In
the school aid cases, the Court has repeatedly stressed two factors that
make state involvement with religious training unacceptable: first, state
funds are used to advance religion, even if only to a small degree; 5 and
second, the authority of the state is placed behind the action, thereby im-
plying a state endorsement of the religion.6" Both of these factors are pre-
sent in the foster care setting.67
63. R. HUBBELL, supra note 28, at 63-65.
64. The establishment clause only restricts, and can only be violated by, government. The Catho-
lic group home cannot itself be said to violate the establishment clause by promoting religion, but the
clause applies broadly to actions by the state that authorize and/or fund such activities. For example,
in MeCullom, religious groups hired instructors at no expense to the state, and, with the state's per-
mission, held religion classes on public school premises. The Court focused exclusively on the actions
of the state and their consequences in holding that use of the public school system and its "compulsory
machinery" was an unconstitutional state support of religion. 333 U.S. at 211-12; see also Wil-
der III, 645 F. Supp. at 1314 (unnecessary to consider whether child care agencies are state actors in
establishment clause challenge since government policies, not agency policies, are at issue); Libin v.
Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 396 (D. Conn. 1985) (volunteer fire department formed
under authority of state law is state actor for establishment clause purposes).
65. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); id. at 40-41
(citing with approval J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS 1 3 ("That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his
property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establish-
ment in all cases whatsoever."), reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65-66 (Rutledge, J., dissenting,
app.)); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437, 441 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (public
school prayer offends establishment clause by financing religious exercise, even if money involved is
small). But cf. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (public funding of student's expenses in travelling to religious
schools not unconstitutional); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions to religious
organizations not unconstitutional despite similarity to direct financial support).
66. See McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 226-31 (1948). Justice O'Connor has sug-
gested that endorsement is the crucial evil the establishment clause is intended to prevent. Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). State foster care policies may not
seem to convey a public message of endorsement, but they could indeed convey such a message to the
foster children who receive religious education while under state authority. Cf G -and Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-91 (1985) ("Shared Time" program where private school students
may take secular courses taught by public school employees creates impermissable symbolic connection
between religious education and government).
67. A state placement policy oblivious to religion is not likely to affect the religious makeup of the
community, as a policy of secular upbringing would. Such effects may, however, be present under
certain circumstances. For example, if a religious sect encouraged its members to become foster par-
ents, the state's "religion blind" placement policy would result in a disproportionate benefit to that
religion. It is also possible to imagine situations in which this result is intended by the legislature,
when the religion in question represents a majority in the state.
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C. Religious Matching
As discussed above, many state statutes still require that religion be
matched in custody decisions. Many of these statutes apply to both adop-
tion and foster care.68 Some states have separate statutes dealing with fos-
ter care, including five states that do not practice matching in adoption.69
In practice, such statutes may be a poor guide to the actual effect of reli-
gion in adoption placement decisions in various jurisdictions."0 States with
no statutory matching provision may include religion as one of the factors
influencing the determination of the "best interests of the child,' 7 1 while
the effect of matching statutes is often diluted by loose judicial interpreta-
tion. For example, the New York State Constitution mandates that reli-
gion should be matched "when practicable, '7 2 but the New York Court of
Appeals has interpreted this to mean that "religion is but one of many
factors in the placement of a child for adoption," and religious matching
"though desirable, is not mandatory."7 3
A distinction must be made between matching by parental preference
and matching by "imputation."7'  The former involves using religion as a
placement criterion only when the natural parents express a desire for
their child to be raised in a particular faith, while the latter type of
matching calls upon the placement agency to determine, in situations
where no parental preference has been expressed, the "religion of the
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-435 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4063 (1964); MD. FAMI.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-520 (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.221 (Vernon 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §
43-509 (1984); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 62.241 (Michie 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:19
(1977); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2151.32 (Anderson 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1119
(West 1987); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5113 (Purdon 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1520 (Law.
Co-op. 1985).
69. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 205 (West 1984) ("so far as practical"); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
17-36 (1985) ("if practical" and "faith is known or [reasonably] ascertainable"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, para. 5007 (Smith-Hurd 1981) ("as far as possible"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 32
(West 1965) ("unless sufficient reason [precluding matching] is noted in the record"); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.17(1)(i) (West 1987) (defining religion as factor going to best interests); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 373(1) (McKinney 1983) ("as far as practicable"); W. VA. CODE § 49-2-1 (1986) (same);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.62 (West 1957) (authorizing agencies to provide training in religion of natural
parents);-Wvo. STAT. § 14-6-221(j) (1977) ("when practicable" and "choice of equivalent services
exists"). Among these states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
have no religious matching in adoption. Only Delaware has an adoption matching statute without a
statute applying to foster care. See supra note 46 (adoption statutes).
70. See Columbia Note, supra note 45, at 376.
71. "Best interests" may be defined by statute or case law. Minnesota by statute includes religion
as a factor in determining "best interests." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1)(h) (West Supp. 1988).
72. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 32. New York is unique in mandating religious matching in its
constitution. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 709 (rev. ed. 1967). The elevation of this
principle to constitutional status in 1921 was the result of a long history of concern for religious
interests in child welfare. See Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
73. Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.2d 61, 65, 281 N.E.2d 153, 155, 330 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348 (1972),
appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972); see also, e.g., In re Walker, 159 Cal. App. 2d 463, 324 P.2d
32 (1958) (similar language in California matching statute not mandatory, but child's welfare
paramount).
74. See Note, Religious Matching Statutes and Adoption, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 262, 264 & passim
(1976).
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child" and to place the child accordingly. Matching by parental preference
is arguably necessary under the "parental rights theory" to protect the
natural parents' right to determine the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren.7 This argument is stronger in the case of foster care than adoption
since the natural parents retain many parental rights;76 requiring reli-
gious matching "when practicable" allows courts to balance compelling
state interests against free exercise rights and to refuse to consider religion
only when doing so would clearly be detrimental to the child.7
Matching by parental preference can minimize the impact of state in-
tervention on the religious upbringing of the individual foster child by
giving the child (somewhat) the same religious training that her natural
parents would have provided. But this is not a comprehensive policy to-
wards religion in foster child placement; it must be supplemented with a
policy addressing the numerous cases where no preference is expressed.
For example, New York City allows natural parents to complete a form
designating religious preference, including a "no preference" option, but
in nearly eighty percent of placements the form is not completed.7 8 In
these instances, one of the other alternatives discussed-secular upbring-
ing, no religious consideration, or matching by imputation-must be
applied.
Matching by imputation is statutorily required by a number of states,7 9
but New York may be the only jurisdiction that continues actively to en-
gage in the practice. The New York statute mandates that placement must
be made to an agency or institution "under the control of persons of the
same religious faith or persuasion as that of the child."8 The "religion of
the child" is defined under the statute as either the expressed preference
of the parent, or, "[i]n the absence of expressed religious wishes . . . it
shall be presumed that the parent wishes the child to be reared in the
75. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
76. See Note, supra note 74, at 280-81. One commentator has argued that the parental rights
theory cannot justify religious matching requirements in cases of involuntary foster care because "once
parental unfitness invokes state intervention, the child's welfare takes precedence over parental pre-
rogatives." Note, Constitutionality of Mandatory Religious Requirements in Child Care, 64 YALE
L.J. 772, 785 (1955). This analysis would support using religion only as a factor in determining the
child's best interests, but historically courts have required a compelling state interest in the child's
welfare, such as imminent physical harm, to justify interference with parental free exercise rights. See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
77. Religious matching would be detrimental to the child if it resulted in the child being placed in
an otherwise less desirable setting, or if it required the child to spend time in an institutional setting
while waiting for a suitable "in-religion" foster home to become available, or if the religious practices
themselves are harmful to the child. E.g., In re State (Interest of Black), 3 Utah 2d. 315, 283 P.2d
887 (1955) (children adjudged neglected because parents were Mormons practicing polygamy), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 923 (1955). But see Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987) (distinguishing
Black; polygamy not conclusive reason to deny custody in divorce).
78. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 20, Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988) (Nos.
87-7406, 7408, 7410) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Brief].
79. All of the foster care-specific matching statutes, supra note 69, and many of the general cus-
tody statutes, supra note 68, require imputation if literally applied.
80. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 373(1) (McKinney 1983).
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religion of the parent.""1 Evidence suggests that the religion of the parents
may be determined by inferences from their surname or ethnicity, case
worker observations of religious symbols, and other speculative means.82
Imputation will invariably alter the religious upbringing of many chil-
dren, since the assumptions behind it are not universally valid. Evidence
of the natural parents' faith can be misleading. More importantly, the
assumption that parents would raise children in their own "religion,"
often similarly imputed, is frequently incorrect: many parents do not prac-
tice or teach the religion in which they were raised. Consequently, match-
ing by imputation is likely to result in more children receiving religious
training as a result of foster care.
The New York scheme essentially imputes a religious faith to the child
and then, acting in loco parentis, asserts either the child's or the parents'
free exercise rights on their behalf."3 The constitutionality of legal impu-
tation of religion to the child has been vigorously assailed. 4 Professor
Pfeffer has called such an imputation "exactly what an establishment of
religion is-the imposition of a religious status by political authority." 5
Furthermore, imputation of religious status requires accepting one of vari-
ous religious doctrines regarding when a person acquires, or becomes a
member of, a religion;86 state recognition of one religious doctrine over
another is prohibited by the establishment clause.87
The settlement negotiated with New York City and approved by the
Second Circuit in Wilder IV will effectively terminate matching by impu-
tation in New York City. 8 The plaintiffs in the Wilder cases were moti-
vated at least as much by the prospect of receiving better foster care ser-
vices in a "first-come, first-served" placement scheme without religious
matching as they were by a feeling that the establishment clause was vio-
81. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373(7) (McKinney 1983).
82. Interview with Marcia Robinson Lowry, Director of the Children's Rights Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union (plaintiffs' counsel in Wilder cases) (November 25, 1987) (summariz-
ing depositions of foster care professionals in New York City).
The New York imputation procedures have been defended by their draftsman, Shad Polier, as
representing reasonable inferences about what the expressed parental preference would be if it had
been obtained. Polier, Religion and the Child, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
83. See infra notes 92-114 and accompanying text (criticizing reliance on free exercise rights).
84. See, e.g., Pfeffer, supra note 45; Ramsey, supra note 60.
85. Pfeffer, supra note 45, at 384-85.
86. Conflicts over this area of religious doctrine have led to disputes of precisely the type that the
establishment clause should prevent. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). For exam-
ple, in 1858 Europe was divided by the hostile conflict arising from Pope Pius IX's refusal to release
a Jewish infant who had been forcibly removed from his home by papal guards after his Catholic
nurse had surreptitiously baptized him. 9 JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 35-36 (1905) (quoted in Pfeffer,
supra note 45, at 334 n.12).
87. See Ramsey, supra note 60, at 668-75. Courts have occasionally blundered into pronounce-
ments about the validity of sacramental acts in determining a child's religion. See, e.g., Matter of
Santos, 278 A.D. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1951) (finding that two girls who had been baptized were
Catholic, despite intensive Jewish training while young), appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 483, 109
N.E.2d 71 (1952).
88. Religious matching in the rest of New York state was unaffected by the Wilder litigation.
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lated, 9 and this concern is reflected in the nature of the settlement. The
settlement states two main goals for the New York City foster placement
scheme: "[T]o ensure that all . . . children . . .receive services without
discrimination on the basis of race or religion and have equal access to
quality services and to ensure that appropriate recognition be given to a
statutorily permissible wish for in-religion placement. . . ."" In essence,
the new placement scheme will be one of matching by parental preference
with no religious consideration in the absence of expressed preference. 1
III. ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION IN FOSTER CARE
Neither the body of establishment clause jurisprudence since Everson
nor the Wilder litigation has resulted in an adequate justification for gov-
ernment activities that have radical effects on religious life. Such an expla-
nation must be developed if courts are to apply a principled approach
when refereeing interactions between church and state.
A. The Wilder I Decision: Free Exercise Accommodation
When the Wilder litigation began in 1973, the district court, on its own
motion, considered whether the New York foster care scheme on its face
violated the establishment clause. 2 In considering the statutory scheme
89. Plaintiffs also alleged that their free exercise rights were violated by policies of the sectarian
institutions, particularly the refusal of Catholic institutions to provide birth control and abortion in-
formation. Wilder II, 645 F. Supp. at 1303. The settlement guarantees access to such information
and protection of the children's free exercise rights by requiring agencies to provide all children with
the opportunity to practice their religion, and by protecting them from compelled religious practices.
Proposed Stipulation of Settlement para. 70, Wilder III, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (78 Civ. 957) [hereinafter
Settlement). For a summary of the settlement, see Wilder III, 645 F. Supp. at 1304-07 & passim.
90. Settlement, supra note 89, at para. 4.
91. The settlement reached between plaintiffs and New York City calls for a classification and
ranking of child care programs to be performed by outside consultants. Settlement, supra note 89, at
paras. 6-8. A child would be placed in the best available program, without regard to religion, unless
the natural parent(s) expressed a religious preference. Id. at para. 24. The settlement also requires
that case workers fully explain the options for religious placement to natural parents, in an attempt to
avoid situations where parental wishes must be inferred. Id. at para. 57. The parent is given the
option of (a) having the child wait until a vacancy occurs in the best "in-religion" program, (b)
having the child placed in the next best "in-religion" program, or (c) having the child placed in the
best available "out-of-religion" program. Id. at para. 30. The settlement also strictly defines the situa-
tions in which an agency can reject a placement; religious factors are not considered valid. Id. at para.
34.
92. The court distinguished Dickens v. Ernesto, 30 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1972), which upheld the consti-
tutionality of religious matching when practicable with regard to adoption, on the grounds that in
Dickens no state funding was involved in adoption placement. Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1023. See
also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
Since the Wilder I court took up the question of the facial constitutionality of the New York pro-
gram on its own motion before any factual record was developed, plaintiffs' counsel elected not to
appeal the ruling. Instead, they pursued the claim that the New York scheme was unconstitutional as
applied, since they believed that the facts strongly supported the plaintiff's case. Interview with Mar-
cia Robinson Lowry, Director of the Children's Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union
(plaintiffs' counsel in Wilder cases) (November 25, 1987). New York City's Corporation Counsel
apparently shared this belief and negotiated a settlement that promises to reshape New York's foster
care scheme dramatically. See Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 78, at 19 (quoting affidavit of Frederick
A.O. Schwarz, Jr.).
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described above, the court concluded that the scheme violated both the
purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test. The court found that reli-
gious matching has a "principal objective. . . to provide for the religious
education of foster children in accordance with the parents' wishes,"" 3 and
that this purpose is not secular." Further, the court found that the ex-
press provision of funds for religious training "directly support[s] the reli-
gion involved." 5 Because violation of any prong of the Lemon test is suffi-
cient to render a statute unconstitutional, the court did not consider
whether the New York scheme created excessive entanglement with
religion.9"
Recognizing that apparent establishment clause violations occasionally
have been held valid nonetheless,97 the court considered whether any free
exercise rights were protected by the New York scheme," and identified
two sets of such rights in the foster care setting: those of the natural par-
ents, and those of the foster child.99 The court then held that the scheme
"represent[s] . . . a fair and reasonable accommodation between the Es-
tablishment and Free Exercise Clauses."100
One commentator has asserted that the Wilder I court went beyond the
Supreme Court rulings recognizing a parent's right to control a child's
religious upbringing 01 by extending the right to parents without cus-
tody. 02 If this is so, such a step is not unjustified; retention of parental
rights must be assumed absent a compelling reason for the state to in-
fringe upon them.103 Indeed, while the Second Circuit in Wilder IV re-
jected the claim that parents have a constitutional right to same religion
placement, it acknowledged that some free exercise interests exist: "So
long as the state makes reasonable efforts to assure that the religious needs
of the children are met during the interval in which the state assumes
parental responsibilities, the free exercise rights of the parents and their
children are adequately observed." 10 More important was the court's un-
93. Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1024.
94. Id. Recently, the Supreme Court indicated that alleviation of government interference with
religious interests is a secular goal and therefore a legitimate purpose for state legislation. Amos v.
Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2868 (1987). However, the New York scheme still
appears to violate the effect and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. See infra note 96 and accom-
panying text.
95. Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1024.
96. The Wilder III court indicated that the New York scheme does involve entanglement, and
questioned the Wilder I court's conclusion that the alternative of state-run, non-sectarian agencies
would result in greater entanglement. Wilder II1, 645 F. Supp. at 1332.
97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
98. Wilder I, 385 F. Supp. at 1025.
99. Id. at 1026.
100. Id. at 1029.
101. See supra note 21.
102. Note, supra note 74. This argument may have been influenced by the author's focus on
adoption, in which all parental rights are terminated.
103. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
104. 848 F.2d at 1347.
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stated inference of an exercise of parental rights in the large majority of
cases where the natural parents express no religious preference, and con-
sequent failure to address the problems associated with imputation.10 5
The court in Wilder I attempted to justify this inference by casting a
duty on the state to assert the parents' free exercise rights in their ab-
sence. 08 The notion that the state can claim free exercise rights is a fic-
tion that fails to remedy the defects of the parental rights theory.107 No
government body has free exercise rights, 0 ' but for the Wilder I court,
"the state must wear two hats, one as a surrogate parent obligated to
enforce the biological parent's rights . . . and the other as a govern-
ment. .. .*"19 Without citing any precedent, the court cast the state in
the role of the natural parents' agent, and reasoned .that this role justifies
an unprecedented state claim of free exercise. In fact, however, when the
state exercises control over the foster child, it does so in its own right.110
The court also found that the state has the duty "of fulfilling the child's
Free Exercise rights" ' which arises from the state's role as "surrogate
parent." But the Supreme Court cases cited on this point actually involve
parents asserting their own free exercise right to control the religious up-
bringing of their children, rather than parents asserting the childrens'
rights." 2 This misinterpretation of precedent is not necessarily fatal;.eveni
if the state is not an agent of the natural parents for purposes of protect-
ing the religious rights of the children, the Wilder I court's identification
of foster childrens' free exercise rights could be valid. The argument is
most plausible when the child is of sufficient age to express a preference;
if the state, or an agency, refuses a child's request to make available reli-
gious training, a free exercise suit would probably succeed. 3
With younger children, however, the argument fails. Imputing religion
to a child not old enough to assert a religious faith on her own involves an
impermissible imposition of religion on the child by the state." 4 The free
exercise accommodation doctrine relied upon by the Wilder I court justi-
fies New York's foster care scheme only if no attention is paid to the case
of younger children whose parents have not asserted their religious rights.
105. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
106, 385 F. Supp. at 1026.
107. See Note, supra note 74, at 282-83.
108. See Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 396 (D. Conn. 1985); Wilder III, 645
F. Supp. at 1325; M. YUnOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 42-50 (1983).
109. 385 F. Supp. at 1026.
110. See Note, supra note 74, at 283.
111, 385 F. Supp. at 1026.
112. See supra note 19.
113. The plaintiffs in Wilder did make such a claim. See supra note 89.
114. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
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B. Establishment Clause Accommodation
The court in Wilder I was misled by the analogy to the military and
prisons." The Supreme Court's use of these examples of permissible
sponsorships of religion"' has led numerous commentators and the Wil-
der I court to conclude that the presence of free exercise rights was crucial
in justifying these apparent violations of the establishment clause.11 7 But
the Supreme Court itself has never relied exclusively on a threat to free
exercise interests to uphold a statute. As Justice Brennan has made clear,
the Court speaks of general accommodation of religion rather than of ac-
commodation of free exercise: "[T]he Court's decisions have indicated that
the limits of permissible governmental action with respect to religion
under the Establishment Clause must reflect an appropriate accommoda-
tion of our heritage as a religious people whose freedom to develop and
preach religious ideas and practices is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. 118 Moreover, the Court has emphasized that "the limits of
permissable state accommodation of religion are by no means co-extensive
with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."'1"
Cases in which free exercise is apparently a factor can be explained
more compellingly by an accommodation doctrine based exclusively on the
establishment clause: when every possible policy offends the establishment
clause, the state must pursue the policy that seeks neutrality. Within this
doctrine, infringements of free exercise interests are considered as mani-
festations of government hostility towards religion.
The Wilder I court could not strike down the New York religious
matching statutes in the absence of a less violative alternative.' ° As dis-
cussed above, every possible foster care policy entails establishment clause
violations.' But the inevitability of establishment clause problems must
not force states to abandon foster care programs entirely (as well as all
other social programs which involve the state in the affairs of daily life).
Nor should this inevitability lead to a complete suspension of judicial
scrutiny of establishment clause problems in situations where separation is
impossible. Judicial intervention clearly would be justified if a state were
115. 385 F. Supp. at 1026. Other courts and commentators have been similarly misled. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Center, 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (hospital receiving public
funds may employ chaplain to protect free exercise rights of confined patients); Knight, supra note 35.
116. See supra note 37.
117. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 35.
118. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. b668, 673 (1983): Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
760 (1973).
119. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
120. Wilder 1, 385 F. Supp. at 1028.
121. See supra notes 57-87 and accompanying text. The Children's Rights Project of the ACLU
takes the position that, due to the lack of separation caused by the foster care situation, permanent
custody should be stressed as a goal in child placement. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
PoI.cY GUIDkt. 362-66 (rev. ed. June 1986) (Policy #272(c)).
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to mandate that all foster children be raised as Protestants. In approving
the stipulated settlement, the Wilder III court found that the stipulation
"'presents no greater danger of impermissibly advancing religion than ex-
ists under the present system of foster care upheld on its face in Wilder
L.,1122
C. Neutrality as a Standard
Weighing the relative seriousness of establishment clause violations is
difficult. The Lemon test identifies three distinct types of violation, but the
Court has not attempted to rank these types in importance. The Wilder
III court had difficulty in making this judgment; the proposed settlement
would be less likely to advance religion impermissibly than the existing
scheme,1 23 but it seems to involve greater entanglement. 124 Can these vari-
ables be fit into a single equation? The relative weights will be determi-
nable only if a unitary standard is developed. This standard can be found
by defining neutrality.
1. Neutrality Defined
"Neutrality" originated as a description of a country's allegiances dur-
ing wartime.1 25 A neutral country endeavors to take no part in the conflict
and is, ideally, indifferent to the outcome. This wartime metaphor may
seem inappropriate to apply to the religion clauses, but it is accurate in at
least one respect: in the American religious domain, government should
endeavor not to affect the outcome.
One way in which neutrality usually can be achieved is through com-
plete non-involvement. For example, government wisely avoids monitoring
the-content of sermons, or adjudicating intramural religious disputes. This
passive neutrality is feasible, however, only where government is modest
in its powers and responsibilities. When government assumes a greater
role, its actions and its inactions will frequently have effects in the reli-
gious sphere, including the religious faiths of foster children. Passivity is
not always neutral; for example, a debate moderator who does nothing to
restrain on debator's abuse of the rules surely is not neutral. Therefore,
an active consideration of the impact on religion may be necessary to in-
sure neutrality.
Professor Kurland has argued that neutrality can be achieved only
through what might be termed obliviousness: "religion may not be used as
a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether that
action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of duties
122. Wilder III, 645 F. Supp. at 1333 (emphasis in original).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1337.
125. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 939 (5th ed. 1979).
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or obligations."' 26 But the Court has rejected Kurland's thesis as a "rigid
conception of neutrality" which fails to account for situations in which
religious classifications are necessary to avoid hostility towards religion.127
Obliviousness is sometimes hostile rather than neutral, because neutrality
is measured by the expected effect of one's actions. Neutrality can be de-
fined only as a goal, not as a method.
Neutrality towards religion means that government should attempt not
to alter the outcome of a religious situation through its involvement. When
involvement is unavoidable, neutrality may demand an active accommoda-
tion of religious interests to avoid having government action produce
repercussions in the religious sphere. All approaches to religion in foster
care have some inevitable transformational tendencies for the individual
children involved, and, to a lesser degree, for society as a whole. Requir-
ing a secular upbringing would give many children a more secular up-
bringing than they would otherwise receive, and would result in less reli-
gion being practiced on the whole. Religious matching, on the other hand,
tends to lead to opposite results. And while ignoring religion as a factor
may or may not have effects on the general religious composition of soci-
ety, by leaving the religious fate of the child to chance this policy maxi-
mizes the tendency to transform the individual child's religious
experiences.
2. Wilder and Beyond
The New York foster care scheme, especially as modified by the settle-
ment in Wilder III, can be justified, though on a far different theory from
the one relied upon by the Wilder I court. The state's policy should be
.judged by its tendency to give children the same religious upbringing as
they would have had if the state had not intervened. When the trans-
formational tendency is used to evaluate the relative neutrality of state
policies in foster care, the policy of matching by preference with religion
not otherwise considered appears to be the best approach possible, since it
minimizes the effect of foster care on the religious upbringing of the child
when evidence is available, and minimizes the effects on society in those
instances where evidence is lacking.
IV. CONCLUSION
The establishment clause is easiest to apply in situations where strict
separation is possible. In many situations, including foster care, strict sep-
aration is not possible, and the establishment clause cannot be interpreted
to prevent governmental involvement in these areas. The examination of
126. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 & passim (1962).




foster care presented above should serve the same purpose as a controlled
scientific experiment: by removing the variable of free exercise rights as a
solution to a situation in which separation is impossible, we discover that
the establishment clause is-must be-sufficient in itself to produce reli-
gious accommodation. Government must be neutral towards religion, but
neutrality cannot be captured through any singular method. Instead, neu-
trality must be understood to consist of a sensitivity to the effects of gov-
ernment activity and an attempt to minimize the transformational conse-
quences of these effects.
The arguments offered above have implications for areas more visible
than foster care. For example, commentators have argued that the Su-
preme Court's rulings excluding religion from public schools result in
government hostility towards religion rather than neutrality,"2 8 and re-
cently critics have claimed that public school curriculum is leading to the
secularization of society.' 29 This type of outcome-oriented argument may
be valid, if it is presented with a careful consideration of the transforma-
tional tendencies of the alternatives.
128. See, e.g., Louisell, Does the Constitution Require a Purely Secular Society?, 26 CATH. U.L.
R~v. 20 (1976); McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 146 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L.
RFV. 127 (1985), Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic
Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196 (1982).
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